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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
ALTON R. MA'l"ERS, 
Petitioner ,a;nd Relator, 
vs. 
M. J. BRoNsox, -one of the Judges 
of the Third Judiciat District 
Court of the State of Utah, and 
the Third Judicial District 
·Court of the !State .of Utah in 
and for ·Salt La:ke ~County, 
Defendamts. 
Case No. 6252 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Counsel for defendants have argued that prohibition 
is not the proper remedy in the instant case. The argu-
ment is predicated upon the assumption that the order 
of the lower eourt against which relief is sought is a 
final order from w hic.h an appeal ma.y be taken. If that 
assumption is found to be not justified then counsels' 
entire .argument falls to the ground. 
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The orde,r in the instant'. ~case 1s .not a final order 
fr.om 'vhich an _a:p:peai will lie. On. the contrary it is 
a.~ alte.rnative, .conditional and .anti,cipatory order. It 
I •- ' ' '-
could -only be ·made final and app:ealalbie .after petitioner 
had suffered irreparable injury hy suhmitting to an in-
spection by the tax c.onmri.ssio.n of his books, ree;ords and 
files and by presenting himself for examination relating 
t.o matters concerning which the'ta.x commission has no 
authority to m'ak~ s.uch inspecti~on or to conduct such ex-
amination, or, in the alternative, ~by refusing to make 
such ·submission and to testify and then submitting to 
the humiliation .of being declared to he in contempt of 
cou!t and . being se:ntenced to a term in pris·on. 
I. 
ORDER COMPLAINED OF NOT FINAL OR APPEALABLE. 
·The order o.f the district court against ·which these 
proceedings are dir~cted is as follows: 
"In accordance with the Findings of Fact 
and C:onclusions of. L~aw 1nade and entered this 
29'th day of Ma.rc!h, A. D. 1940: 
'''IT Is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED .that Alton R. Mlayers he .and he is hereby 
· f.ound g1lilty of cont~empt under Section 104-45-15, 
Revise-d Statutes of Utah, 1933, ,a:nd it is further 
or.dered that said Alt·on R. Mayers may purge 
himself of said contempt by appearing before the 
1State Tax c·ommission on M.6nday, the 8th day of 
Ap.ril, A.· D., ·1940, at .tbe hour of 10:00 o'·clock 
A. M., and there to testify and produce the books, 
records,· docum·ents, etc., called for by the sub-
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poena of the State Tax Commission heretofore 
issued and heretofore duly s.e_rv'ed upon said.; ~\1-
ton R .. Mayers; that, in the _event s·aid Alton R. 
Mayers does not so purg-e hin1s.e'l.f of s.aid .con-
tempt, he appear hef·ore this Court on Monday, 
the 8th day of April, A. D.,. 1940, at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock A. M. f.or sentence.'' 
In this state, 104-41-1, R.evised Statutes, of Utah, 
193'3, an appeal lies only from fin.al j'udgments of the dis-
trict court. The above order is not a· finar· order. It is 
conditional and alternative. 
L ·-·· 
The general rule with respect to· conditional or alter-
native judgments, orders or decre·es· ·is well. 'stated under 
the subject of Appeal and Error in 3 C. J. 556-7, Section 
396: 
"·~ * * But an order adjudging a con-
tempt, and prescribing a pui,lishment conditi.ona.l 
upon the action of the party in contempt, is not 
a final ·order, and is therefore not .app·ealalble. ·Nor 
will an appea'llie from an order adjudging a party 
in contempt, but reS'erving the question of punish-
me:nt f.or further consideration, from an order 
requiring one to sho\v c.ause why he should not 
be punished for contempt in £a,iling to appear as 
a. witness, or from a mere initiatory order dire0t-
ing an attachment to issue for the purpose of 
. bringing the party before th·e court to answer in-
terrogatories. * * *" 
The general rule announced. a1bove finds exemplifica-
tion in the case of Semrow v. Semrow, 26 Minn. 9, 46 
N. W. Rep. 446 (1897). The facts in th.a.t case and the 
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4 
court's ruling thereon are set forth in the following two 
eXJcerp·ts from the .court's opinion : 
''The order, which is the subje-ct of this ap-
peal, was granted upon an order to show cause 
why defendant ought not to be punished, a.s for 
a cont·empt of .court, for refusing obedience to a 
previous order made in the aetion, requiring hin1 
to pay to plaintiff a certain .sum therein named as 
temp·orary alimony. In substance and effect, it 
adjudges him guilty of the contempt charged, and 
furth·er directs, as punishment therefor, that a 
warrant shall be issued for his arrest and c:om-
mit:ment for the time mentioned therein, unless 
he pays the amount of suCJh. alimony awarded, 
with interest from the date of the order gr1anting 
it, with $10 costs o.f m.otion, within 10 days after 
personal service upon him o.f the last-.granted 
order. In other words the order adjudges him in 
contempt, prescrilbes the terms upon which, and 
the time within which, he may purge himself of 
the contempt, and orders the prescribed punish-
ment in case he fails to comply with the c-ondi-
tions within the required time. 
·''Whether this is an .appealable order is the 
first question for consi.deration. If an appeal lies 
at all, it must be under the first clause of the 
sixth subdivision of Gen. rS.t. c. 86, Se~c. 8, which 
allows an appeal 'from a final order affecting a 
su~bstantial right, made in a special proceeding.' 
·The .order in question i.s not one of that character. 
It is not .a final order in the ma.t·ter. It is a pre-
liminary and conditional ·one, dire:cting the punish-
ment of the party d·efendant in case he re.fuses 
to comply with its requirements. No warrant ean 
be issued or arrest ·made under it. Before any 
punishment can be inflicted up·on him, proof must 
· 
1be made to the court that he has refused to com-
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ply "~ith its conditions, and a final and absolute 
order made thereon, directing it. It· nray be that, 
upon the application for that order, faets may be 
sho,vn upon which the court below 'vill feel eom-
pelled, in the exercise of its discretion, to "\Yith-
hold it .altogether. The present is not, therefore, 
·an absolute and final order affecting any sub-
stantial right of th·e party, and is not appealable. 
Brinkley v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. 40. App·e~l dis-
missed.'' 
What is said in the a·bove ca.se concerning the eon-
ditional and preliminary nature of the order there under 
consideration could be said with equal appliea!bility in 
the instant case. 
In Brinkey v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. Rep. 40 (1871), a 
similar order was under consideration, concerning which 
the court said at pag·e 46: 
''It will be noticed, upon a reading of the 
order, that it does not, as to a part of the speci-
fied punishment, .absolutely impose it upon the 
defendant. It is an order, in the first part of it, 
that unless within ten days he complies with the 
order which he had refused to obey, and pay ten 
dollars cost, his ansrwer .should be stricken out, 
and the .cause s:hould proceed as if there were no 
.answer, and that it be referred t.o a referee named 
t.o take proofs. The order, s·o far, is C!onditional. 
The punishment is not inflicted absolutely, but it 
is in his power to a vert it; and if he doe.s not a vail 
himself of the condition, there must 'be proof put 
·on file of his failure so to do, and another order 
of the court making peremptory and .absolute that 
which, by tthis o-rder is but condi tiona I. * * * ' ' 
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In Cherry. v. Cherry, ·253- ·Ma:.ss~ 17'2, 148 · N., E. 570 
~ 1925·);_ pro:c·eed.ing·~. ·:were commenced in.· M'assachusetts 
t? enjoin the defendftnt from :prosecuting: a divorce ac-
tion in Nevada. · F'or failure to obey an order of the 
c-ourt e~1joining further prosecutio_n of the divorc.e action, 
defendant. w:i's ordered placed in the cust;ody of the 
sheriff, but the case· was eontinued for sentence for two 
'veek:s, during which '-time the defendant was directed to 
dismiss the Nevada proc-eeding. If he failed to do so 
he was to be committed to the custody of the sheriff 
until co-mpliance was made. Defendant did not appear 
for sentence and his sureties were defaulted. A w·rit of 
er-ror w·as sued out ·but the court dis-missed it ·on. t1he 
ground tha1t defevn,darnt had no-t been. sentenced and there 
:was no foncil judgmevn.t. 
In Boorii>s v. Log·an, (M.ass.) 1~64 N. E. 9121 {1929), 
a' .. decree was entered· of this tenor : ''This cas-e came on 
to he- h.eard upon merits, having been argu·ed by coun-
s~l, and .thereu:pq~,~·· upon consideration thereof, it is 
ordered, adjudged a1_1d decreed upon return to the pJ,ain-
_tiff {)f the sum of oll.e thousand dollars ($1,000) paid as 
depos{t the bill he dismissed.'' C'oncerning this decree, 
. ' ' 
the appellate eourt s·aid : 
"This \vas not a final decree either in .form 
or .substance. It did not unequivO'cally or-der that 
the· bill he. dismissed, but· made such dismissal 
conditiona~ upon the return of a specified sum 
of money to the p·Laintiff. It did not order- the 
_payment of that sum to -the plaintiff by anybody. 
It simply stated in effect tha.t upon the retur:J?. to 
the plaintiff of that sum the bill w-ould be dis-
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missed. The decree '"as anticipa tor~T in :every 
essential. The case remained -subject to further 
a.etion hy the c.ourt. Loonie Y. Wilson, 2~3 M~~ss. 
· 420, ±~3, 1~4 N. E. 272; Cherry Y. Cherry·, 25:3 
M·ass. 172, 1716, 1-!8 N. E. 570." 
In Nutt v. State (Miss.), 49 So. 1~5, an order. of the 
court adjudged the defendant to.~b~· in conte~pt .and 
ordered that if he did not ~comply with the c:o~rt's dire~­
tion he would be sentenced at a future time. An appeal 
was taken from this order and was dismissed Qecause 
it lacked finality. 
Eure v. Taylor, 126 Miss. 155; 88 So. 514, cites the 
Nutt case and dismissed an appe:al from an order lack:-
ing finality be-cause the order gave .the defendant .ten 
days to purge himself of a conte·mpt.,: and failin-g he was 
to have been sentenced. 
Counsel for defendants cite several cas-es including 
the Cta.se of Bamkers Trust Company v. District ·court, 62 
Utah 432, 220 Pac. 708, on the proposition that prohi-
bition will not lie where appeal after judgment will con-
stitute an adequate remedy, but such citations are based 
upon the assumption that an appeat lies from the ord.er 
in the ~case at bar. That assumption is erroneous, the 
cited cases are not applicable. 
The case of Snow v. Svn,ow, 13 Utah 15, 43 Pa,c. 620, 
1s c~ted . by defendants as showing that appeal will lie 
from a judgn1ent finding a person to he guilty· of .a civil 
contempt. 
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Unlike the instant case, the order appealed from in 
the Snow -case was an order or-dering that a warrant of 
arrest issue and that the appellant he committed t.o the 
custody of the marshall until he purge himself of such 
conten1pt. In thra.t. e:ase there was a definite commitment 
of the appellant to the custody of the marshall. H·e was 
sent to jail for his disobedience of the court's order. 
II. 
PROHIBITION IS PROPER REME'DY. 
In the preceding pages it has been demonstrated 
that the order in question was n\ot a final or appealable 
order. Since certiorari is a correetive and not a pre-
ventive remedy and since it is not here sought to correct 
any action .of the district court already taken, hut on 
the contrary to prevent threatened future action, it is 
apparent that petitioner has no adequate remedy in t~e 
ordinary course of la.w· either by appeal or certior:ari, 
and that he is without any remedy for the threatened 
wrongful action of the district -court except by pro-
hibitiron. 
The errors of the district court complained of by 
petitioner are such a.s to create an intolerable situation, 
fraught with hardship and injustice. As shown by peti-
tioner's application herein and his brief in support there-
of, the tax commissi1on although ·not having any right or 
.authority so to do, served upon petitioner a subpoena 
requiring him to appear before it with his books and 
records and give testimony 0oneerning the inheritance 
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tax liability of the estate of his deceased mother. .The 
tax 0ommission had no right, power or authority to issue 
such a subpoena. Such proposed exan1inatilon -vvas not 
in any manner limited 'hy any issues nor in any man:ner 
~canalized. It \Yas admittedly s-ought for the purpos-e of 
aiding the examiner·s to prepare themselves to meet or 
form issues that might or might not later arise. The 
subpoena is an impertinence. It enmmanded a citizen 
to show his private papers and records to a commission 
possessing no power to enforce inspection except per-
haps by ¥lay of depositi,on or subpoena duces tecum. 
Unless the defendants are restrjained, petitioner 
must yield to thes-e illegal and unlawful demands of the 
tax commission or .submit himself to the defendants and 
suffer the imposition -of a fine or jail sentence. No need 
is there to labnr the point to demonstrate the hardship-s 
impos.ed by the order ·complained of. There is a remedy 
against being publicly judioially stigmatized. In the! in-
stant case that remedy is prohibition. 
In cases of irreparable harm or injury or hardship 
courts relax the ge:neral rule 'vi th respeC't to when pro-
hibition will or will not lie. Under this trend, appellate 
courts in pr.ohi,bition proceedings do not look too closely 
to see if the action o.f the defendant is mere error within 
its jurisdiction or entirely beyo:nd its jurisdiction. 
In the case .of Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P. 
(2nd) 377 ( 1936-), this court in an opiniion written by 
Justice Wolfe ~squarely f~aced the propio,sition of whether 
a writ o.f prohibition would lie in a ·case of error 'Vithin 
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the jurisdicti·9n -of t]l.e court, and decided that prohibition 
was a pro-per. remedy·) under such circumstan,ces. In that 
case the ·C'Ourt. used this language, at page 387' of Pacific 
Reporter: 
'' rrhis i!Jpstrates the dilemma into which 
courts ·have· been forced because there is no ade-
'qua te machinery provided .for reviewing inter-
lOicutory or intermediate actions by lower courts 
·w·hen such actions relate to those matters which 
·cannot readily or never can he undone by an ap-
peal f:rom a final judgment even though the court 
h.a s jurisdiction.'' 
P·aTtly .at least this trend has its basis in the inade-
quacy of judicial machinery as shown by the following 
excerpt found a.t· page 387 o:f Pacific Reporter: 
'''We have suspected, and it is borne out by 
the . cases, that, owing to the inadequacy of judi-
cial machinery' the superio-r eourts have ofttinles, 
where the lower court was about to make some 
intermediate,,or jnterlocutory order vv-hich -vvould 
seriously .affect a relationship, a status, a right 
to hold office, or the right of lienholders, stOick-
holder,s, creditors, or others, or the rights in or 
status of prop·erty, and where the status quo by 
such ordet \Vould he chang-ed from that over -vvhich 
it would he were the suit to proceed along the 
· sin1pie lines of a trial of fact, issued the writ of 
prohibition· for the purpose of st~opping the mis-
chief which would otherwise be done even though 
technically· the-re is no lack or no excess of juris-
diction in the lower 0ourt. Iri iss·uing the writ 
in such a· ca'se, the courts have either taken pai!ls 
not to be. too inquisitive a.s to whether there is ex-
·cess or lac.k of jurisdiction or they ·have s·imply 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
.·: ~ ~: ~-:~~· tWistPd \Vhat is really only errot· ou the~ part of 
- 'the lower ·eou:rt- into lack or excess .of jurisdiction, 
or perchance they haYe found a. situation in\ ~vhich 
there was truly excess or lack of jurisdieti,6n. "· . 
Injustice, hardship or damage is a strong £actor in 
bringing about this trend toward relaxation -of the gen-
eral rule, as s·hown hy the fol1owing excerpt found at 
page 388 of Pacific Reporter: 
~'It is impossible to retC~:oncile all t_he~se deci-
sions or to evolve any rules .·of guidance from the 
eases_ whi1c:h ·can be accurately applied to any given 
situation. What can be Baid-.is that ordinarily the 
superior eourt will look only to see if the lo'\ver 
court "\\7as acting without or- in excess of juris-
diction, and, if s-o, whether there is stilt not some 
adequate and speedy remedy,· but- that, in cer-
tain situations where it would work a palp.able 
injustice or hardship or caus·e damage which could 
not be che1cked or remedied in· an)r other -\vay, the 
superior court "\Vill not go to-o refi:n.edly into the 
question as to wha.t constitutes error n1erely or 
lack or excess of jurisdiict:iO!J: before- issuing the 
writ." 
Olson v. Dis1trict Court, 93 Utah 145, 71 P. (2'nd) 
S29, 11'2 A. L. R. 438 (1937), was an original proceeding 
in certi·orari t.o review orders of the _district court, the 
effect of which \Vas to suspend .any further proeeeding in 
a case until plaintiff should submit to having his de-
position taken. The court held that while the -error was 
an appropriate remedy. C:o~l'cerning the order of the 
' . ' ' -
one within the jurisdiction of the -court, eerti·orari was 
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district court in the Olson case this court said at page 
444 of A. L. R. and pag·e 534 of Pacific Reporter: 
"·That the order of the c.ourt giving defend-
ant Evans ten days after the plaintiff should sub-
,. mit himself to the taking of his deposition on the 
notice a'nd affidavit served and filed was errone-
ous fo11o,vs frtom what -vve have s:aid herein. 
W.hether the court e~ceeded its jurisdiction in 
rnaking such ·Order in a strictly technical and 
philosophical sense might he debatable. It is ex-
. ceedingly difficult, if not impossible, in all cases 
to find and deli'neate the precise dividing line be-
tween that kind of error upon which excess qf 
jurisdi~ct~on may be predicated, and error where 
that element is not involved.'' 
And after quoting from two Utah cases showing that 
the issuance of the writ is in the court's discretion, this 
court in the course of its opi~nion further said on the 
saine pages as a~bove : 
"It thus appears that even though an ab-
solute lack ·Or excess of jurisdiction cannot be 
shown, the w·ri t ean he and, in practice, is issued 
in the sound discretion of the higher court.'' 
In his concurring opinion in the Olson ease, Justice 
Moffat points out that the complained of action of the 
courtbelow was error merely and als·o that the petitioner 
for the writ h1ad not exhausted his remedy rn the district 
court .by applying to have va.c.ated the erroneous part of 
the order complained of, thereby giving the trial court 
oppoi'tunity to correct the error before filing his applica-
tion for certiorari. 
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Justice \Y. olfe in ·his c.oncurring opinion in the OlsoTI 
case expressed doubt as to 'Yhether the order of the 
oourt \Yas beyond or in excess of juri·sdi1etion. He also 
refers to his o'Yn opinion in ·Atwood v. Cox, supra, and 
referrrng to hin1self as the author of that opinion says 
at page 447 of A. L. R. and pa:ge 5.37 of Pacific Rep·nrter: 
"Fie also stated that at times it \Yas neces-
sary for the revie"T eourt to arrest ruction by the 
lower court \Y here only error in the exercise of 
legal po~ver was involved vvhen the consequences 
would be irremedial if the lower court were per-
mitted to ~c;on'tinue in its course; and that in those 
cases, because of the lack ·Of any writ by whieh 
interlocutory orders could he brought up for re-
view ex<cept under the guise of being beyond or 
in excess of jurisdiction, the review .courts benign-
ly stretched the conceptions of jurisdiction to in-
clude treatment of them with .consequent eon-
fusion and contradiiction in concep·tion and in 
cases.'' 
Justice Wolfe summed up his views as to the cl'ass 
of cases in which harm or injustice would result unless 
certiorari or prohibition was held appliea:ble, and used 
the following language at page 449 of A. L. R. and p1age 
538 of Pacific Rep·orter: 
''Several times I have intimated that there 
is need for s~ome writ which will bring before this 
court certain intermediary or interlocutory nrders 
to be issued when sUJeh order would do irremedi-
a~ble .harm or oause .an impasse as in this case even 
though the making of the order was only error 
and not .iurisdictional. U :ntil s·ome mechanism is 
so pr'Ovided, I must continue to concu.r or decide 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l4 
lha:t certibravri and·· prohibition are proper re1ne-
·. 
1
.<"· dies in. su,ch· cases, though .to my mind· the court 
·i:i_··.l~· :;'may fYlot: hav-e a1cted beyornd or in excess of juris-
1t' dict-ion.'' (Italics ours)~ · · · - · , · . 
. . ·,~nd thus in .fhe :Olson case, although the complained 
of actio'n • of ~the. court below·· i'nvolved ·mere error within 
the>c,~urt's jurisd~ct_ion, and a'Ithough the petitioner there 
4'ad not exh;austed .his remedy in the district court by 
m()tion to vacate the erroneous· order, certiorari \-Vas held 
to be·· a· proper remedy. F'or stronger reasons prohi~bi­
t~~9~(sh:ol11d be held tn lie in .the case at bar. 
. In :Eva~s. ·v. E~io,n'S, :----- Utah ·~----, · 98 P. ·(2nd) 703 
}'"'; ' ~ , •,_ I • ' • ' 
(1940), the petitioners sought to make permanent a. tem-
porary ·writ o.f prohibition restraining the defendant 
judge from further 'enforcing or attempting to enforce 
a'n order requiring:·· the petitioners to p~oduce certain 
reeords before a·no±ary deput:ized to· take the. deposition 
o.f. one of the pet:itioners. While the writ was discharged 
because the order directing one of the petitioners to pro-
duce the minute :book of a corp·oration was valid so far 
as .. appeared on its face, this court considered the ease 
on, its merits and in the course of its opini·on reiterated 
the rule la,id down in Atwood v. Cox and O:lson v. Dis-
trict. iJou,rt, supra, to the effect that rn e~rtain cases whe-re 
h'ard-ship or injusti:ee otherwise would result it would 
disregard techntcalities and 'would rel~ax the general rule 
With. re$pect t~ wh.en prohi,bition will or "\\'il{.not lie. In 
that connection the· court said a:t page 707: , 
~ ~:J'd fJ~i.> '' *-. * .:; ·* · 'The question is, thererore, is the 
error one which results in usurping jurisdiction, 
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.or is it only e:rror \Yithin the, fr~unework of its 
jurisdietion -~l l"'he first. is ~jurisdictional error, 
Jhat is. that \\Thich takes UU\varrau ted jurisdic-
tion; the secO'nd is error \vithin jurisdioti·on. The 
.differenc-e bet\Yeen these t\YO kinds of error is 
s·ometinles very difficult to disting-uish.· We tre.at-
ed this at length in At\Yood Y. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 
55 P. :2d 377. It is unnecessary furither to elabo-
rate upon it. It \Yas als.o the~e· ~aid, that" ~here 
-the erPor \Yas such as to prevent· any ade-quate 
remedy by appeal b~caus-e by t·hat. time the har1n 
already \V·ould ·be done, we would not look __ . .too 
closelv to see if the threatened alct.ion of the court 
would be mere -error -within' its jurisdic.ti;on·: 'or 
jurisdictional error. We follpwed that .d9:ctrine 
in Ols·on v. District C-ourt, 93 Utah 145, 71 P. 2d 
529, 112 A. L. R. 438." , , . 
r •• • 
As further evidence of the trend towavd relaxation 
l '' • < ~* C: ' I 
·Of the strict general rule we cite the following ex•eerpt 
from the -eoncurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in the caS>e 
of Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 P. (2~nd), 1'-262 
(1936), \vhieh .appears at page 1:267 ·of P,aicific Rep:orter: 
" .. ~~ * * In the case· o.f At,vood' v. Cox, 
supra, I stated that the action of the t-rial judge 
in the McCrea. ·Case in regard to which a, .writ of 
prohibition was sued oui was really' not one he~ 
y-ond his jurisdiction but error only; yet the· re-
sult of leaving the correction. of such error .to 
appeal would be locking the stab1e. door aft.er .. th.e 
horse was stolen. Owing to the necessity 'of.· ar-
resting the trial court presently . in· -order "that 
grievous, irremedial injury would not result, this 
court held prohibition was proper, ·which required 
that it construe what was really error as being 
juris.dicti~onal.'' 
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'Tn ., their brief counsel cite the case of Cro·wther v. 
Distri-ct Court, 9·3 Utah 586, 54 Pac. (2d) 243, as one in 
\Vhieh this e;ourt had before ~t much the. s·ame question as 
is presented by the ease at bar. We rC.annot agree that 
the· question there presented w.as even similar to that 
presented in t!he ease at bar. In that ·case the defendant 
court had issued a citation dire·cting petitioners to ap-
pear and show ·Cause why they should not he punished 
for cont·empt for dis·ohedience to .a previous o~der of the 
court requiring them to appear at a time and plaee speci-
fied in·order that their dep.ositio'ns mi,ght be taken. Pur-
suant to tlrat citation, the petitioners appeared and ob-
jected to the jurisdiction of the court and moved that 
the citation he quashed. While that motion was under 
advisement by the defendant court, the petitioners ob-
tai'ned an alternative writ of prohifbition from this court 
directed to the defendant court. Within the time fixed 
in the alternative writ, the defendant eourt appeared 
and moved that the petition for the writ and the order 
contained in the alternative writ be dismissed for the 
rea~so'n th.at at the time the writ was served on the de-
feud-ant court it had determined to dismiss the contempt 
proceedings then pending before it, and stated that if 
the alternative writ issued by this court were to be 
vaca~ted he would dismiss the contempt proceedings then 
pendi~ng before him. Under such circumstances there 
was :nothing left f.or this court to do except to recall and 
vrueate the .a1ternative writ and to deny the petition for 
a~ perm'anent writ. 
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Counsel also cite the ca.se o.f Boa.rd of Home ·Mis-
sio-ns v. Mau.ghn. 35 Utah 5}6, 101 Pac. 5-81 (1909')~. In 
that case the petiti<mer sought to restrain the defenrdant 
judge from continuing \Yith a hearing in which p·etitioner 
as garnishee 'Yas being examined to as,cer,tain whether 
one B;arrett had money due him fron1 the petitioner. The 
petitioner claimed that the garnishment proeeedings were 
instigated by B·arrett for the purpose of dis(eovering 
what evidence would be presented by petitioner in a se~ 
para te action by p-etitioner against Barrett then pending 
in .a·nother court. This court refused to gra.n t the writ 
and said that the error of the lower -court, if any, was 
not in excess of its jurisdiction even though an appeal 
from the order .of the court would have been too late to 
prevent the dis!Closure ·Of evidence. The fa,cts in that 
ease are substantially different from the facts i•n the case 
at bar. That case was de:cided in 1909, before the ex-
-ception to the general rule above referred to ha:d been 
recognized by this court. To the extent that this case 
i~ not in harmony with .AtwDod v. Cox, supra, Olson v. 
District Court, supra, and E;vatns v·. Ev·a:ns, supra, 've 
su'bmit that it is overruled by those cases. 
The other cases ·cited by counsel on this point are 
eases which uphold the general rule that prohibition is 
an ex·traordinary legal remedy which is to be used spar-
ingly, and that it will not lie '\vhere there is a. plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy i•n the ordinary course of 
larw. We have no quarrel with such rule. Our position 
is that the f·acts in the ins~tant case c:ause it to fial1 within 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
the rule annou»·c.edin AtwDol} v. Cox, .. Ol$on v ... District 
'; ,1 
1
l ,:.. I' . ' I' ·· ' -
Court and Evans :V. EvamiS,·supDa. 
Counsel al~o- cite Attorney: ()enera.Z v. Pomeroy, 93 
Vt~;h :f2'6, 73 P .. (2~~d) 1277, 114 ·A. L. R. 72!6 (19·37), t10 
sho~. :that the order adjudging the petitioner to be in 
contemP't -could have been ap·pealed from without wait-
ing for sentence .. · That case does not so hold. Prohibi-
·~. ., ' . 
tion issues w.here there is not a. plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the ordimary course of law. 
. .. ., 
. ,.The P·omeroy 0ase involved an app~'al from an order 
of nonsuit. kn intricate set of facts in that case dif-
ferentiates. it fr·~~ the case at :bar. Beeause of the entry 
of the order of rJ.Onsuit as to certain of the parties, the 
Attorney General would lra ve been obliged (unless an 
appeal frotn su~ch order had been allowed) to mark time 
while the action wa.s berng tried by the receiver a~~inst 
the ~defendants, and then if on appeal the order of non-
suit ·had been reversed, the .Attorney General in proof 
of his case would have been required to introduce in evi-
dence against the d.ismissed defendants the same evidence 
tha.t was introduced against them by the receiver. Be-
cause of that unu~ual si'tuation, the order in that case 
wa:s regarded as an a ppeala:ble 'One. This. court in that 
connection said at p~age 129.8 of Pacifi.c Reporter and 
7;~1,· 7·52 of A. L. R. : 
' . . 
'' * * * The rule (concerning what constitu-
, tes a .final judgment) is not so inflexible that we 
cannot retain the appeal when we ca'n, by express-
.: - ing an -opinion on the matter app·e.aled from, save 
a dou'b1e ·· trial. It is a discretion and ex·ception 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
' : . t.. \ f·'': . h~--"t-~~- ··rarely to he used, btit "·e think this is one of th'e 
times ''"hen ''"e should ·m-ake an exception t'o ·the 
general rule. 
'. 
"* · * · -* The economy of the situation re:-
·quires a rel.ax·a tion of tl1e r~le. Had. the p l'aih tiff 
not brought this appeal he "vould · have :t:run,.· the 
risk of this ·eourt taking a different .view,;in which 
case his time for a.ppeal vYould have ru.n. . l-Ie., wa_s 
bet,Yeen the devil and the deep' se·a. '' (P.arentheses 
ours). ; '· · 
It vYill be noted th'at in that case this court sai•d: 
'' 'Ve think this is one of the times wh'e:ri we should ·make 
an exception to the general rule." .(Itaii~cs ours). ' TO 
make an exception in one case ·certainly cann,ot · he r:e-
ga.rded as ''in the ordinary oourse of 'law.'' 
For the same purpose as the Pomeroy ease is Gi~e_d, 
counsel also cite In re Thomas, 5·6 Utah 3-~5, ,190. ~·a·c. 
. . . . \ ~-·· 
952 (19'20); Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 PaY:~. (2d) 
1262 (1936) ; North Point, etc. Comp(J{ny v. Utah. &; .S~ L. 
C{JIYIJa.l C:o., 14 U ta1h 1;55, 46 P·ac. 824 ( 189·6) . 
In In re Thomas, supra, the judgment of contempt 
was a final one from which an appeal lay .as- sho·wn. by 
the· following excerpt appearing on page 954 of Paci:fi1c 
Reporter : " r,.,_,:-
''After heari·ng the evidence., ·which- is very 
voluminous, the court adjudged all three griilty 
·of eon tempt, and entered judgxnent a1c:cordingly. '' 
· There W'as nothing alternative or conditional about 
that ·JUdgment. Therein lies the differ:ence between that 
judgn1ent and the order in the- case at bar. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
·. --Shu;rtz v~ Thorley, supra, involved an appeal from 
an order o:f dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as to one 
of two· defendants. It was b;eld that the order of dis-
missal was ·not a final and appealable one. 
In North Pomt, etc. Co. v. Utah d!i S. L. C·a.nal Co., 
·sup-ra, which was an action to restrain defendant from 
dis:charging certain waters upon the lands of plaintiff, 
the District o·ourt granted a·n injunction pendente lite. 
D~efendant appealed from the order granting the injunc-
tion, and respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the 
ground that it was not a final judgment. The appeal 
was dismis·sed on the ground that the order was not a 
final· or appealable one. 
III. 
TAX COMM·IS'SION WA:S WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
TO I1S.SUE SUBPOENA IN QUEISTION . 
. Qiounsel for defendants state that it is only by rea-
son of the pr-ovisions of Se-Cttion 80-5-46 ( 16) that the 
tax commission has the subp·oena power in connection 
with any tax act and that it is by reason of that section 
that 'the ta.x commission has taken the position that it 
has ·the· ·subpoena power in the case at bar. ~Subsection 
16, 80~·5-46 is a:s follows: 
''To examine all records, hooks, pa.pers and 
documents relating to the valuation of property 
of any -corporation or individual, an'd to subpoena 
witnesses to a1ppear and give testimony. (lfnd to 
produce rgcord·s, books, p·apers a!Jil.d docu/Jnents re-
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la:ting to O/ny m.a.tter tvhich the tiaX c:orrvmission. 
shall ha·ve aulhority to itnv·estig:ate or .deterrnine. 
The tax eommission or any party may in any in-
v-estigatibn cause depositions of witnesses to be 
taken as in civil ,a;ctions. Any memiher of the 
state tax com1nission, its secretary, cashier, and 
such other officers or employees as the ~commis­
sion may designate, may administer oaths and 
affirmations in any matter or proc.eeding relating 
to the exercise o.f the po1Yers and duties of the 
tJax co1nmission. '' (Italics theirs). 
Counsel argue that the language of this subsection 
is clear and unambiguous and that it gives the subp~oena 
power to the tax commission ''in relation. to affV!J 'YYW/Itter 
which the tax commission shall home avu.thority to ivnr 
vestigate or determine.'' 
This section gives the -commis.sion power "to ex-
amine all records, books, papers and ~locuments relating 
to the valuation of property of any corp:orartion ·OT in-
dividual.'' The power to make such examination is given 
with respect to the valuation of property of a;ny .corpora ... 
tion -or individual. The valuation and a!ssessment of 
property is the fundamental thing which the legislature 
had in mind when conferring these p·owers. That view 
is horne out by the fa1ct that Chapter 5, and all of its 
64 sections, relate exclusiv-ely to the assessment and col-
leotion of taxes on real and personal prop-erty. ·It was 
the valuation and assessment of real and peorsonal prop-
erty which the legislature had in mind. That was the 
subject matter of the act. ·The next clause of su'bs~e,c.tion 
}6 reads: ''and to subpoena witnesses to appear and give 
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tesiitnony and to produce reeords, bo-oks, papers and 
documents relating to any matter which the tax eomrriis~ 
sioi1} ·.shall: have'· authority to investigate or determine:'' 
The· true n1eaning o.f the phraseology last quoted· will be 
di selosed if' the ·words ''concerning ·such valuation ·of 
property" are ±n~strrted after the words '·'any matter". 
With that phr~a.se so interpolated the phraseology_ in 
question would read: '·'and to subpoena witness-es to ap~ 
pear: and give testimony and to produce records, .books, 
papers and documents relating to any matter concern-
ing such valuation of pro'Perty which the tax commission 
shall.have authority to investigate or deteTmine. '' 
In other words, by the first clause of this subse-ction 
the ta'x commission· is given the right to go to the tax-
payer's place of busti·ness and ~xamine all records, books, 
papers and documents relating to the valuation of his 
property, hut if the ·commission doesn't choose to go to 
his p~ace of bus~ness for such examination, it may if it 
80 elects subpoena the taxpayer or any other witness to 
appear and give testimony a·nd produce his re1cords,. 
boo~s, papers and documents relating to such valuation. 
The phrase ',, r·ela ting to any matter which the tax. co~m­
mission sha~l have authority to investigate. or, deter-
mine'' has reference only to the as·sessment and valua-
tion o.f real. and personal property. 
_T;he legislature by this sulhsection did not intend to 
confer· up·orn the tax commis·sion a·ny subpoena powers 
conCHrning inheritance tax matters. What the · legisla-
ture did and what it int'ended to do wa·s to confer· upon 
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th~ tax <:onunission a po\Yer eo-extansiYP and -onl)·· eo-
extensive "·ith the principal or subs·tantive powers gr,a.nt-
ed to the eomn1ission by the a'ct of 19131. Chapter 5, Title 
80, sho\vs that that a.cf relates exclus,ively to . the as-sess-
ment ood collection of taxes on real arnd personal prop-
erty. In Yie\v of that fact this subpoena. povver is 1nerely 
ancillary and in aid of the sn:bstantive powers granted· to 
the ·Commission by the act. 
This rule of construction IS laid down in 59 C. J. 
980, in the following language : 
"·Gener.al \vords in a statute should receive ·a 
general construct1on; but they must be understood 
as used with reference to the subje·ct matter in the 
mind of the legislature, and strictly limite9. to_. it. 
Their meaning may, if ·necess_ary, be expanded, 
as may that of narrower words, oT their 'nie'iining 
may be restricted, and they s:hould .be ·so limited 
in their application as not to l~ad to injustice, op·-
pressi,on, or an ahsurd con-sequence. So words of 
general import in a statute are limite·d by words 
of restri1cted import immediately following·.: an~d 
relating to the s.ame suibject. . * * * '', · .
. See: State v. Hyde, 88 0Te. 1, 1'69 Pa.c. 757, Ann. Cas. 
1918E 6B8 ( 1918) ; Uzzell v. Lunney, 46 .· Colo. 403, 104 
Pac. 945 (1909'); U. 8. v. Osage Coun:ty, 19·3 Fed.' 485 
(1911); Lewis v. Northern Facific Ry. Co., 36 Mont.' 207, 
92 Pac. 469 (1907). 
; :The povvers conferred on the tax commission by the 
wet were powers relating exclusively;·>to· the assessment 
of· taxes on real and personal property. The subp:oena 
powers thereby granted to it were limited to inv,estiga-
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tiop.s ::~oncerning real and personal prop·er!ty Thes.e pow-
ers. !co~uld not l;)e,, eAtended to include investigations. con-
ceili~ing excis.~, ,ta.:x;es . such as those . dealt with in , the 
corporation Jran,·chise tax a·et and.the individual incom·e 
tax act. 
: A study ·of the··statutes will demonstrate that where 
subpoena powers have been given they ha:ve been speci-
fically given and ·n,ot given by implication. Defendants 
take the position that subpoena powers are not spe-ci-
fically grant~d in t,he follo:wing a~cts: sales tax, use tax, 
mp~p:r vehicle registration, cigarette tax, ol·e-omargarine 
tax,; motor fuels tax and inheritanc'e tax. They contend 
tp~.t tlle general power under S·ection 80-5-46 ( 16) gives 
th~. tax commission subpoena powers in all of these acts. 
A. r~a~ing of. the. acts will demonstrate that that con-
, .'.·· '. ' - :. 
tention is n·o:t. in any degree tenable. Se-ction 9 of the 
~al~,~: tax a;ct provides that the taxpayer shall preserve 
his books, etc. for a period of three years and that "the 
same shall he open for examination at any time by the 
tax commission * ' * *. '' (L·. 1'9·33, Chapter 63, Section 
9, ·as· :.Amended by Chapter 103, L,. 19·39·) . 
. '· ':Section 20 of· the use tax aet has substantially the 
s.ame provision (Chapter 114, Laws· of Utah 1937) .. 
· :The m·otor vehiele registration a1ct spe-cifically :gives 
th.e'>tax cbirrrci.ssion authority to summon witne·s~es. to 
gr~e: :testimony and to require the production of rele~ant 
j : ; I 1 .. J ; } · . . : . ~ · ·. . . · . . . . , · , ho:oks; pap.ers ·and records. (L. 1935, Chapter 46, S.ection 
:fa).~,u .·. .. . 
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The cigarette and oleomargarine tax a.et gives the 
tax commission the po,ver to enter upon the premises 
of the taxpayer and examine his books, papers, records, 
ete. {93-1-14, R .. S. 1933, as amended by Chapter 7, Laws 
of Utah 1933, S·ec.ond Special Ses.sion). 
The motor fuels tax act gives the comnnss1on the 
right to insp~ct the record of all purchases, reeeipts, 
sales and distriibution of n1otor fuel of eruch distributor. 
(Section 57-12-13, Chapter 67, Laws o.f Utah 19·39'). 
The po,ver of subpoena can be used only when di-
rectly and .speci:fi,c.ally given. This power should be used 
sparingly. F'rom the limited powers given· in the above 
acts it is plain that the legislature did not regard th·e 
tax commission as having subpoena power except where 
s·peci:fi.eally given. In the motor vehicle registration a-ct 
the legislature wanted the commission to have subpoena 
power and specifically gave it such power. 
It must be borne _in mind tha.t there is no pending 
litigation. Nothing is pending before the tax commis-
sion nor before the courts to d·etermine the inheritance 
tax liabilitT of the estate of Nellie R. Mayers. There 
may never be such a controversy. The tax commission 
insists that it ha.s the right to subpoena wi tne-ss,es· and 
require them to bring their books and records for un-
limited examination and before any is·sues are fixed or 
even contemplated. Wh·en proceedings are instituted the 
tax commission ·needs no subpoena powers. It will then 
have the power of .summons and deposition. In the ex-
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ercl'se of those rights the witness will he protected in 
person and in property by the issues formulated and by 
the fact that the person taking the deposition or the 
clerk of court will be the custodian o.f the records. 
0 f 0 O'Uh'ltS el 
Respeetfuly submitted, 
BALL AND MussER,_ 
Attorney-s for 
Petitioner and Relator. 
CoNWAY A. AsHTON. 
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